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COLORADO SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
(EwTORS NoTE.-It is intended in each issue of the DicTA to print brief abstracts
of the decisions of the Supreme Court. These abstracts will be printed only after the
time within which a petition for rehearing may be filed has elapsed without such action being taken, or in the event that a petition for rehearing has been filed the abstract
will be printed only after the petition has been disposed of.)

APPEAL AND ERROR-APPEAL FROM COUNTY COURT TO DisTRICT COURT.-No. 11,960.-Katz, vs. Cohen.-Decided

October 1, 1928.
Facts.-May 6, 1927, Katz had judgment against Cohen
in the County Court of Denver. The defendant, Cohen, was
granted time and given twenty days within which to elect to
appeal. On May 24, 1927, and within the period of twenty
days, the defendant appeared in the County Court and sustained the judgment and made an appeal to the District Court,
and on that day the County Court allowed the appeal on the
condition that he file an appeal bond to be approved within
ten days. The bond was filed and approved within this time.
It was contended that the Statute provides that appeals from
the County Court to the District Court must be made within
ten days after judgment unless the Court upon sufficient cause
shown extends the time for perfecting the appeal.
Held.-The County Court's granting twenty days within
which to elect to appeal was the equivalent of granting further
time within which to perfect the appeal, and the appeal was
made in time.
Judgment Affirmed.
APPEAL AND ERROR-DAMAGES-I NSTRUCTIONS.-No. 12,001.

Rollman vs. Stenger, as Receiver.-Decided October 29,
1928.
Facts.-Margaret Rollman was injured in a collision with
a street car operated by employees of Stenger, as Receiver.
Verdict and judgment was for the Plaintiff. Plaintiff failed
to incorporate in Abstract of Record the instructions given by
the Court.
Held.-Under the circumstances, the Court will not consider refusal to give requested instructions for so far as the
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abstract is concerned, the Court may have given an instruction stating the law substantially as requested. To entitle a
party to have this Court consider an assignment of error based
upon the refusal of the Trial Court to give a requested instruction, the abstract must set out the instructions that the
Court gave to the Jury. In any event the Court finds no actual
error in the Trial Court's refusal to give the requested instruction.
Judgment affirmed.
AUTOMOBILES--IMPUTED NEGLIGENCE.-No.

11,914.-Paul

Parker, Plaintiff in Error,vs. Anna Ullom, Defendant in
Error.-Decided October 28, 1928.
Facts.-One Ullom, husband of the Defendant in Error,
riding in an automobile driven by one Beckman, was killed in
a collision with an automobile driven by Parker. The evidence tended to show that Beckman and Ullom were acquainted, that at the time of the collision they were on their way to
participate in a gambling game. Beckman owned the car
which he was driving, and was not subject to Ullom's control.
Parker contends that Beckman's negligence should be imputed
to Ullom.
Holding.-In a case like this, negligence will not be imputed to a passenger unless he undertakes to or has the right
to exercise control over the movement of the vehicle.
Judgment affirmed.
COGNOVIT NOTES-PROHIBITION.-No. 12,104.-The Investors Finance Company vs. Luxford, as County Judge.-Decided October 29, 1928.
Facts.-The District Court sustained a demurrer to an
alternative Writ of Prohibition addressed to the County Court.
The Finance Company obtained a judgment in 1922 on a
cognovit note without service or notice on maker. Maker's
attorney was in correspondence with the Company at the time
and had set forth his client's claim of defense and was led by
them to believe that they acquiesced in these claims. Yet during this correspondence they took the judgment.
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Held.-That this amounts to fraud in procuring the judgment. Judgment debtor moved to set it aside and County
Court so ordered. Order was right. Motion was the proper
way to present the matter. County Court did not lose jurisdiction after one year to set it aside.
Judgment affirmed.
DEBTS.-No. 12,157.Searle vs. Town of Haxtun.-Decided October 22, 1928.
Facts.-Suitwas brought against the Town of Haxtun to
enjoin the issue of bonds for improvements to the town's electrict light plant. The town already owned an electric light
plant and voted the bonds for the purpose of making improvements. It was claimed that if the bonds constituted a debt
that they were in excess of the constitutional limit.
Held.-That since by the term of the bonds the bonds
were payable only out of the income from the plant and the
town itself was under no obligation to pay them, that such
bonds did not constitute a debt of the town within the constitutional meaning of debt.
Judgment affirmed.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-MUNICIPAL

DECREE-MODIFICATION.-No. 11,983. - Levand vs. North
America Realty Company.-Decided October 8, 1928.
Facts.-Decree was entered by lower Court against Levand, requiring specific performance of a contract for sale of
real estate. Levand prosecuted a Writ of Error to the Supreme Court and the Decree was affirmed in its entirety. One
of the things which the Decree required Levand to do was to
procure and deliver a policy of fire insurance on the improvements in the sum of eighteen hundred dollars. Levand claimed
he could not comply because the improvements-did not exceed two hundred fifty dollars in value, and was cited for
contempt.
Held.-Lower Court had power to modify a Decree as
to portion impossible for performance even after the Decree
had been affirmed in its entirety by the Supreme Court.
Decree so Modified.

DICTA
DEEDS-DELIVERY.-No. 12,179.-Ora Pearl Griffith, vs. Le-

lia May Sands, as Administratrix, et al.-Decided October 8, 1928.
Facts.-Plaintiff's father signed, sealed and acknowledged a deed, which purported to convey certain land to plaintiff, but died without actually delivering it to her. Prior to
his death he stated that upon his death the deed should be delivered. Plaintiff sues the administratrix and heirs of the
grantor in said undelivered deed.
Held.-That there must be an actual delivery of a deed,
and that the facts in this case do not justify a holding that there
was a constructive delivery, as the deed was expressly not to
be delivered until after the death of the grantor. Delivery is
not merely a matter of intent alone, but some act by which the
grantor parts with control of the instrument must accompany
the intent. There is only oral evidence of a trust, and that is
insufficient under the Statute of Frauds.
Judgment affirmed.

DISPUTED BOUNDARIES.-No. 1 1,952.-Gameell vs. Strum-

pler.-Decided October 15, 1928.
Facts.-Action by Gamewell for injunction to restrain
Strumpler from entering upon Gamewell's lands. Answer
was general denial, coupled with demurrer for insufficient
facts. Judgment below for dismissal of the action.
Boundary lines between lands of plaintiff and defendant
had been changed by decree of the District Court in a former
action under Chapter Twenty-four of the Code of Civil Procedure.
Held.-Decree established boundary lines in the former
action and was sufficient under Code. The fact that lands
lying in township other than the township in which plaintiff's
and defendant's lands lie were included in the decree, did not
effect the decree between plaintiff and defendant. Service by
publication on defendant held to be sufficient.

.Judgment affirmed.
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DIVORCE-DIVISION OF PROPERTY.-No. 11,773.-Ikeler vs.
Ikeler.-Decided October 8, 1928.
Facts.-Mrs.Ikeler obtained verdict and findings of fact
and conclusions of law in a divorce case, and a decree dividing
the property was entered before the six months for entry of
final decree had elapsed.
Held.-Under Statute, alimony and counsel fees, pendente lite may be allowed before final decree of divorce, but
no decree for division of property can be entered until a final
decree of divorce is granted.
Judgment Reversed and Case Remanded.
MANDAMUS-ELECTIONS.-No. 12,231.-Armstrong, Secretary of State, vs. Simonson.-Decided October 19, 1928.
Facts.-Simonson obtained an alternative Writ of Mandamus commanding the Secretary of State to accept for filing
a certificate nominating Simonson as candidate for office as
State Senator.
Simonson had been designated by the assembly of the Republican party for State Senator and had accepted the designation, but was defeated at the primary by Stephen. Stephen
had died between the date of the primary and the general election. The committee to fill vacancies thereupon had nominated Simonson to fill the vacancy created by the death of
Stephen.
Held. - Section Five, Chapter Ninety-eight, Session
Laws of 1927, which declares that "No person who has been
defeated as a candidate in primary shall be eligible as a candidate for the same office in the next ensuing general election",
does not prevent the second choice of his own party for the
nomination for a particular office from receiving the nomination where the first choice of the party was prevented through
death, or voluntary surrender of the nomination from being
a contender for the office.
One of the principal purposes of this statute was to prevent a person who had sought a party nomination and was
defeated at the party primary election from running as the
candidate of a rival party in opposition to the candidate of his
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own party, and/or to prevent such person from running independently by petition after being defeated in opposition to
the candidate of his own party.
Judgment Affirmed.
MANDAMUS -

MUNICIPAL

CORPORATIONS. -

No. 12,087.-

City of Victor vs. Halstead.-DecidedOctober 8, 1928.
Facts.-Halstead obtained a peremptory Writ of Mandamus against the City of Victor, ordering the levy of a tax
to pay certain interest coupons on bonds of the city. Defense
was that the City was heavily in debt and that if the levy was
made, it would require a levy of eighty-three mills, forcing
property owners to abandon their property.
Held.-I. The granting or refusing to grant a Writ of
Mandamus is somewhat discretionary with the Court.
2. The Court below did not abuse this discretion. A
judgment should not be refused on the ground that a trial
Court has abused its discretion, unless the record clearly discloses a plain abuse of that discretion.
Judgment Affirmed.
NUISANCE.-No. 12,047.-Mongone vs. The People.-De-

cided October 29, 1928.
Facts.-Mongone was perpetually enjoined from conducting or maintaining a nuisance on certain property under
the Provisions of Chapter 136 of Session Laws of 1921.
Held.-Complaint stated a good cause of action in equity
for the abatement of a nuisance. Where the real estate was
described by lot and block number in the Complaint, but
the evidence showed that the building was located at the
southwest corner of two certain streets, the real estate was
sufficiently identified.
Judgment Affirmed.
PAYMENT.-No. 12,051.-McAloon vs. Erickson.-Decided

October 15, 1928.
Facts.-Erickson had judgment in Trial Court against
McAloon, et al, for failure to deliver a tax sale certificate.
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McAloon owned the tax certificate, deposited it with the
County Treasurer for proceedings to get a tax deed.
Erickson wanted to get an assignment of it and gave a
check drawn on Cheyenne State Bank which was deposited
in Akron Bank and sent to Cheyenne State Bank with instructions to remit a draft for it. The Cheyenne State Bank failed
before the check was paid.
Held.-McAloon should have demanded cash of Cheyenne State Bank and if he had, he would have received the
money before the bank failed. Bank was McAloon's agent
and when bank accepted draft instead of cash, it did so at its
own risk.
Judgment Affirmed.
PLEADING AND PRACTICE-D ISMISSAL.-No. 12,190.-Sch u eler vs. O'Berdo.-Decided October 29, 1928.
Facts.-O'Berdowas plaintiff and on his motion the District Court dismissed his action and the counter claim of the
defendant. A notice of the motion to dismiss, and that the
motion would come up for hearing on March 3 was served
on February 28. On March 3, the hearing was continued to
March 12, when the dismissal was ordered.
Held.-That the plaintiff may dismiss his action at any
time before trial if no counter claim has been made. The
notice of dismissal was served before the counter claim was
filed. The order of dismissal related to the first step taken
in its procurement and is to be regarded as having been made
at that date.
Judgment Affirmed.
PLEADING-QUANTUM

MERUIT.-No.

12,161.-McDonald,

Plaintiff in Error, vs. Thibault, Defendant in Error.-Decided October 15, 1928.
Facts.-TrialCourt rendered judgment against McDonald. Complaint alleged that defendants were indebted to the
plaintiff on account of services rendered as broker in securing
a purchaser for hotel business.
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Complaint failed to allege either an agreed price or the
reasonable value of the services. General demurrer was overruled.
Held.-Complaint defective because of failure to allege
either an agreed price or the reasonable value of the services.
Judgment Reversed.
PLEADING - DEFAULT. - No. 12,189. - Sauve,
Trustee in Bankruptcy, vs. Hamilton.-Decided October
22, 1928.
Facts.-Hamilton filed suit for foreclosure of a mortgage
given to one of the defendants, the Western Securities Investment Company. The Western Securities Investment Company went into bankruptcy and Sauve was appointed Trustee
in Bankruptcy.
Sauve, the Trustee, failed to appear and default was entered. Sauve after being in default two months appeared,
during the trial of the action, and asked leave to intervene.
Court below denied his application.
Held.-The Court's ruling denying the application was
within its legal discretion. Moreover, evidence was introduced below and Sauve failed to file a motion for a new trial,
and the issue being one of fact and not of law, a motion for a
new trial was essential to secure a hearing on review in the
Supreme Court.
Judgment Affirmed.
PRACTICE -

TAXATION-APPEAL

FROM ASSESSMENT-PROCEDURE.-No.

11,939.-E. J. Longyear Company, a corporation, vs. County of Lake, Colorado.-DecidedOctober 8, 1928.
Facts.-On June 19, 1924, the assessor of Lake County
placed a valuation on certain property owned by the Longyear
Company, on the basis of which tax was levied and paid under
protest. Thereafter, the Company perfected an appeal to the
District Court of Lake County which was allowed by the assessor on December 15, 1924. Depositions were taken by the
Company, and in this the County participated. On March
29, 1926, the County moved to dismiss the appeal upon the
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ground that no complaint had been filed as required by statute.
Holding.-In the opinion in Sugar Company vs. Fellows,
74 Colo. 242, handed down December 3, 1923, the Court held
under Section 7292 C. L. 1921, that the filing of a complaint
in a case like this was not necessary. Thereafter, in the opinion in Phillipsvs. Commissioners, 78 Colo. 387, handed down
December 14, 1925, the Court held that Section 8703 C. L.
1921 required a complaint to be filed within ten days after
taking an appeal. In the present case the appeal was perfected under the earlier decision, and both parties appeared
to have acquiesced in its application. Therefore, the filing
of a complaint within ten days is not jurisdictional, but this
may be done any time before trial.
Judgment Reversed.

TAX SALES-RIGHT OF DEFUNCT CORPORATION TO REDEEM.-

No. 11,961.-Ruth vs. Devany, as County Treasurer. Decided October 22, 1928.
Facts.-Ruth sued Defendant as County Treasurer, et al,
to set aside a redemption from tax sale. A mining corporation had owned the real estate and had been declared defunct
by the Secretary of State and attempted to redeem the property
from tax sale through and by the surviving members of its last
Board of Directors.
Held.-Even though the corporation was declared defunct and inoperative, neither the payment of taxes nor the
payment of redemption money comes within the prohibition
of the statute, being Section 2317 of the Compiled Laws of
1921.
The last Board of Directors of the corporation had a right
to redeem the property from sale because such a redemption
would inure directly to the benefit of the corporation and indirectly to the benefit of the stockholders, and also indirectly
to the benefit of creditors, providing that the corporation
might later on secure enough money to be reinstated.
Judgment fflirmed.

DICTA
WORKMAN'S COMPENSATION.-No.

1 2,141.-Central Surety

and Insurance Corporation, et al, vs. The Industrial Commission of Colorado and Fugitt.-DecidedOctober 22,1928.
Facts.-The Industrial Commission awarded Compensation to Fugitt for hernia. Under the Statute in order for
an employee to be entitled to compensation for hernia he must
clearly prove, first, that its appearance was accompanied by
pain, and second, that it was immediately preceded by some
accidental strain suffered in the course of the employment.
Held.-The facts sufficiently meet the above requirements of the Statute.
Judgment Aflirmed.

RECENT TRIAL COURT DECISIONS
(BDiTORS NoTe-It is intended in each issue of Dicta to note any interesting decisions of the United States District Court, the Denver District Court, the County
Court, and occasionally the Justice Courts.)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT.-No. 788 5 .- Spencer Penrose, vs. United States-J. Foster Symes, Judge.
Facts.-Action to recover additional income tax illegally
assessed on 1918 return. Plaintiff in 1918 sold copper stock
which he contended he acquired in 1916 and on that basis resulting in a loss. The certificates delivered were acquired
prior to March 1, 1913, nevertheless, plaintiff insisted he intended to sell stock acquired in 1916. A gain resulted if the
stock sold in 1918 was acquired prior to March 1, 1913.
Held.-(1) Certificates of stock delivered do not identify the shares sold, the intention of plaintiff controls; (2) the
fair market value of stocks sold on New York Stock Exchange,
dealt in generally and freely, is determined by listed quotations; (3) proof that the grounds in the application for refund
filed before Commissioner are. the same as the grounds sued
upon, is a condition precedent to the jurisdiction of the court.

